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1. Introduction: The Economic Costs of Crime
On the 6th of January 2014, on a highway close to Caracas, the Venezuelan ex-beauty queen Mónica Spear and
her husband were shot dead when hiding in their vehicle during an assault. Their five-year old daughter was shot
in the leg during the incident but survived (Mo 2014). - News like these are nothing uncommon in the Caribbean
country with one of the highest murder rates in the world. The entire Venezuelan population lives terrified and
under the constant fear of armed robbery, kidnapping or homicide. Nevertheless, the death of the former beauty
queen has unsettled people not only in Venezuela, but has met with an overwhelming response all over the world,
reverberating throughout the social media for several days (El Universal 2014).
This resounding worldwide response demonstrates that murder and personal insecurity are topics of great impor-
tance for people in many parts of the world, affecting negatively their quality of life: Apart from the intangible,
personal costs such as the constant fear and strain as well as the grief and pain experienced after the loss of a
family member or friend, crime and insecurity also have measurable social costs for the entire economy. These
emerge first of all from the direct and indirect expenses to prevent and clear up criminal incidents: Police protec-
tion, correction and prosecution. Further costs arise due to the losses and medical treatment of the victims and
crime prevention and deterrence measures (Anderson 1999). Anderson (1999) estimates for the case of the US
that the aggregate burden of crime including all the above mentioned components is equivalent to an 11.9 percent
of annual GDP, or an annual $4,118 per capita - an enormous sum. Even in countries with relatively low levels
of crime, the aggregate social cost is still considerable (for example 6.5 percent of GDP in England and Wales,
Brand and Price (2000)).
According to Detotto and Otranto (2010) however, these sums still considerably understate the total impact of
crime on society, since they do not account for the detrimental effect crime has even on the (legal) economic
activity. The uncertainty and inefficiency created by high crime rates discourage investments and reduce the
competitiveness of firms, consequently slowing down overall economic growth and imposing an even higher cost
on the entire population. These numbers prove that the overall costs of crime are very high, even in societies
with quite low levels of crime. Consequently, we can expect that in countries with a higher crime incidence,
crime’s detrimental impact is enormous and able to paralyze the development of the entire economy. Londoño
and Guerrero (1999) estimated the social cost of only the violent crimes to be as high as 14.3 percent of GDP on
average in Latin American countries. In some countries such as El Salvador, costs of violence account for even a
quarter of annual GDP.
Given these facts, it is evident that we have to counteract the recent trends of increasing violence in several
LAC countries, but the question is how? Is it enough to promote economic growth or reduce poverty and crime
will disappear automatically along the way or do we need specific interventions aimed at crime reduction? To
understand how we can alleviate and/or prevent crime, we have to understand the mechanisms that determine
its incidence. An important piece of the puzzle seems to be the connection between inequality and crime: LAC
does not only display extraordinarily high murder rates, but is also characterized by exceptionally high inequality
(Gasparini and Lustig 2011). For as long as data has been available, income, consumption, health, education or
political influence inequality were highest in LAC (Ferranti 2004). Some striking examples of countries with both
extraordinarily high inequality and homicide rates are Venezuela, Honduras, Belize, Jamaica, Guatemala, Colombia
and Mexico. It is interesting, that also in Africa, countries with exceptionally high murder rates such as Zambia,
South Africa, Lesotho, Angola or the Central African Republic are characterized by high levels of inequality. This
observed positive correlation between inequality and homicide rates raises the question if there is a causal link.
It seems logical that in an unequal society, poor people with nothing to lose decide to commit crimes directed
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against the wealthier citizens since the expected returns are extraordinarily high compared to their alternative
earning opportunities. The murder of Monica Spear is a recent example of such a criminal incidence directed
against a relatively rich member of the Venezuelan society.
So is inequality a driving force behind crime incidence? Whereas the theories (presented in Section 2) predict
a positive impact from inequality on crime, the empirical evidence on this matter is rather ambiguous (LaFree
1999) and no clear conclusion has been reached. Understanding the role of inequality is however important to
design new strategies of crime prevention and reduction. Therefore, in this thesis I want to investigate if there is
causality running from inequality to crime in the continent with the highest levels of both phenomena. Using a
newly assembled, unbalanced panel data set from 21 Latin American and Caribbean countries that roughly covers
the second half of the twentieth century, I conduct fixed effects regressions and Granger-causality tests in order
to check for a causal impact from inequality on crime. Homicide rates are employed as a proxy for overall crime
levels since it has been shown in various studies that they are a very suitable indicator (Neapolitan 1997).
In contrast to previous papers that all used panels with a large number of cross-sections but only a short time
period, I have at hand a panel with a relatively low number of countries but with a large time dimension of
around 50 years. This allows me to observe the development of crime over a longer time period. Apart from a
larger sample, I also contribute to the academic discussion by updating the methodology: I take into account the
possibility of spurious regression. Whereas former studies completely ignored the potential non-stationarity of their
data, I pretest the data for the presence of unit roots and accordingly adjust the model specification to avoid the
possibility of nonsense regression. Not surprisingly, my results differ widely from the results obtained by previous
research. Moreover, I also perform Granger-causality tests as an additional step, a methodology that has not been
applied in previous studies.
The remainder of my thesis is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview over the general theories of crime
as well as the implications of those theories for the relationship between inequality and crime. Furthermore, I
review the results and methodology of previous empirical studies that investigated the role of inequality as crime
determinant. Section 3 presents the assembled data set, the data sources as well as the methodology used to
measure and proxy crime rates and inequality. Descriptive statistics give an overview over the past development
of inequality and homicide rates in LAC. Section 4 introduces the methodologies that will be employed for the
empirical analysis of the research question and the results of the preliminary unit root tests are presented. The
results of the fixed effects estimations and the Granger-causality tests are reported in Sections 5 and 6 respectively,
while Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
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2. Literature Review
2.1. General Theories of Crime
Crime has been present across all cultures and periods of human history and almost every person has been victim
of a bigger or smaller offense at least once in life. Crime appears in a variety of forms that can be divided
into two major categories: offenses against the person (homicide, assault, robbery, kidnapping or sexual assault)
and offenses against property (theft, robbery, burglary, fraud, forgery, etc.). From the 1920s on, scholars in the
disciplines sociology and psychology started to study crime as a social phenomenon and eventually criminology
emerged as an independent discipline, examining the reasons why individuals engage in criminal behavior (Cook et
al. 2013). Until the late 1960s, the analysis of crime was determined by the notion that the character of criminals
was fundamentally different from the “normal”, law abiding people. Delinquents, especially killers, were assumed
to be “vicious, depraved or psychologically disturbed individual[s]” (Cook and Laub 2001, p. 14). An increase in
criminal activity was therefore explained by an unusual prevalence of these anomalous individuals (Cook and Laub
2001), also called the “super-predators” (Bennett, DiIulio and Walters 1996).
In 1968, Gary Becker revolutionized the view of criminality when presenting an economic approach to crime theory.
He simply applied the standard tools of an economist to the topics of criminology, pointing out that criminal activity
is an option open to everyone that can even be a rational choice, depending on the individual’s preferences and the
expected utility of the crime. Is the expected return of the crime, including possible punishment and opportunity
costs such as foregone income, higher than the expected return of the individual’s legal alternatives, he will most
likely chose to commit the crime (Becker 1968).
While certain aspects of the human character, in economic terms “preferences”, still play a role when determining
criminal behavior, Becker’s rational perspective shifted the focus from the time-stable characteristics of the indi-
vidual to situational factors such as the social, economic and political environment that determines the expected
returns of the criminal activity (Cook et al. 2013). Even though a criminal’s preferences may be distinct from the
preferences of non-delinquents, both groups respond rationally to changing incentives (Eide, Rubin and Shepherd
2006), which has important implications for crime-prevention policies. One logical consequence of this approach
is the possibility of deterrence: by aggravating the punishment the criminal expects in the case of being captures,
the expected return of the crime is reduced and might sink below the level of the other options. Thus, crime rates
are expected to be “inversely related to the likelihood and severity of punishment” (Cook et al. 2013, p. 8).
The second determinant of crime independent from an individual’s character is the opportunity cost, because
individuals with something to lose are less prone to engage in criminal activity. The opportunity cost is defined by
the amount a person can earn in the legal sector. Therefore, by improving the earning opportunities of potential
delinquents, it should be possible to reduce crime rates. Since Becker’s first approach, economists and other
researchers have shown that the “super-predator” view of crime is not supported by the data (for example Cook
and Laub 1998). Deterrence is indeed possible, since an increase in the probability and severity of the punishment
has a negative effect on criminal occurrences (Eide, Rubin, Shepherd 2006 Dezhbakhsh et al. 2003) and an
increase of the opportunity costs such as higher wages also reduces crime (Trumbull 1989; Machin and Meghir
2000).
The economic theory of crime, also called the “rational choice theory” is nowadays widely accepted; nevertheless it
cannot explain the mechanisms that determine criminal behavior alone. Other disciplines such as biology, sociology
and criminology have developed their own valid theories about the determinants of criminal behavior.
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Especially in the field of violent and hate crimes, biological and psychological explanations seem to offer an
adequate amendment to the rational choice theory. Typical biological explanations are that “some people are
more likely to commit violent crimes because of the genes they have inherited; or that there is more chance of
acting in an impulsive way [. . . ] if you have attention deficit hyperactivity disorder” which results in lower levels
of self-control (Marsh and Melville 2006, p.15).
Sociological theories of crime focus more on the social circumstances that are conducive to criminal behavior. The
most influential example of a sociological explanation of crime is the strain theory, founded by Robert Merton in
1938. He indicated that in every society, there are certain goals that are considered worth achieving. One very
famous example of such a cultural goal is the “American Dream”, which implies that everyone should accumulate
wealth, regardless of social class. For some people however, social blocks make it impossible to achieve those
culturally defined goals, creating a strain and pushing those people into using illegal methods in order to succeed.
Many times, the importance of the goal outshines the means by which it is achieved, and consequently individuals
under strain will see crime as an adequate adjustment mechanism (Merton 1968). Strain is especially tough
among the lower class, because they “don’t have their fair share of opportunities” (Samaha 2005, p. 88) which
would explain why crime is especially prevalent among the lower classes of society. Several empirical studies have
presented evidence on the impact of strain on delinquency, an important one being Agnew and White (1992).
Theory Determining Factor
Economic Theory Expected Utility of Crime
Biological and Psychological Theories Genes, Psychological Disorders
Sociological Theories
- Strain Theory Inequality, Social Barriers
- Social Disorganization Ethnic Heterogeneity, Residential Instability
Theories Describing the Development of Crime over Time
- Modernization Theory Crime increases with Economic Growth
- Theory of the Civilizing Process Crime decreases with Economic Growth
Cohort Effect Fertility/Age Distribution
Table 1: Overview over the General Theories of Crime
A second theory that focuses on the social conditions in society is the social disorganization theory. Social
disorganization “refers to the inability of a community structure to realize the common values of its residents and
maintain effective social controls” (Sampson and Groves 1989, p. 777). In their classic work, Shaw and McKay
(1942) found that the three structural factors low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential instability
weaken the social bonds within a community, what translates into a higher number of individuals engaging in
criminal activity.
Lastly, there are also theories that instead of looking at factors that determine crime at a certain moment in time
in a certain society, they look at the development of crime over time or over the course of economic progress.
Emile Durkheim founded the modernization theory when already in the 19th century he realized that the transition
from an agricultural to an industrial society and the concurrent increase in the division of labor weakened solidarity
and the social norms that “ordinarily control our natural [. . . ] urges” (Samaha 2005, p. 88). The consequence
was an increase of crime in Europe during industrialization (Rogers 1989; Clinard and Abbott 1973). This theory
gives rise to concerns since it predicts a sustained increase in crime as a country experiences economic growth.
Shelley (1981) further developed this theory, predicting an initial upswing in crime during the initial phase of the
industrialization; however she predicted that as economies mature, crime would decline again.
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Contrarily and less concerning, Norbert Elias stated that as a country develops, it undergoes a “civilizing process”,
experiencing a dramatic change of the nature of human interaction, for example regarding violence, sexual behavior
and manners. The more sophisticated division of labor makes people dependent on each other, and it becomes
necessary to establish common rules, coordinate actions and to adopt self-control. Physical force and violence are
monopolized by the government, resulting in a long term decrease of crime and violence (Eisner 2001). This theory
has been confirmed by scholars such as Pinker (2011), who report that Europe experienced a tenfold-to-fiftyfold
decrease in homicide rates between the middle ages and 1900.
One last driving factor of crime that is rather unrelated to the above mentioned theories is fertility and accordingly
the age distribution of the population. Since most crimes are committed by men in that age group, smaller cohort
size means that there are simply fewer individuals in that high-risk age group and consequently fewer crimes are
committed. Higher fertility and consequently population growth might lead to an increase in crime rates when the
bigger cohorts reach the critical age (Krahn et al. 1986).
2.2. The Link between Inequality and Crime
2.2.1. Theoretical Background
Already in early Marxian theories, inequality and crime were considered to be directly connected. Bonger (1916),
a Marxian criminologist suggested that the exploitation and oppression of the poor by a powerful and rich minority
produces criminal behavior as a primitive form of uprising against the ruling elite (see also Quinney 1974 and
McDonald 1976).
Likewise, the more recent economic theory of crime has important implications on the relationship between
inequality and crime rates: According to the rational choice theory, the expected pay-off from crime in comparison
to the legal earning opportunities is an important determinant of criminal behavior. In unequal societies, the high
income differential makes criminal activities especially profitable for the poor part of society: If we assume that the
benefit from activities such as robbery and theft can be proxied by the mean income of the society (Ehrlich 1973),
then the spread between the mean income and the legal earning opportunities represents the expected return from
crime, which is especially high for individuals at the lower end of the income distribution (Demombynes and Özler
2002). This makes it more likely that criminals come from the lower classes of society (Machin and Meghir 2000).
An increase in inequality increases the spread between the mean income and the income of the individuals situated
at the bottom end of the income distribution, increasing the payoff from criminal activity and thus leading to a rise
in crime. This relationship between inequality and crime has been suggested by many scholars (Ehrlich 1973, Chiu
and Madden 1998, Bourguignon 1999, Demombynes and Özler 2002), however it “does not imply that inequality
per se causes crime” (Demombynes and Özler 2002, p.267). In fact it rather suggests that income inequality is a
good proxy for the returns of criminal activity.
Also from the sociological theories introduced above, important implication about the relationship between in-
equality and crime emerge: For example the social disorganization theory implies that ethnic as well as income
heterogeneity in communities favors the social disorganization process, which ultimately results in higher violence
and crime rates (Sampson and Wilson 1998, Shaw and McKay 1942).
The sociological strain theory of crime likewise indicates a positive relationship between inequality and crime. The
founder of the theory himself, Merton (1938), suggested that antisocial behavior ensues as a result of the strain
suffered by the disadvantaged in a society. The lack of upward mobility, especially if it is perceived as permanent
and/or unfair may drive individuals into hostile and impulsive behavior such as criminal activity. Coser (1968) and
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Blau and Blau (1982) argue in a similar way. While general inequality already comprises the potential for conflicts
and violence, more so does inequality related to ascribed characteristics such as race, religion or ethnicity (Agnew
2001; Blau and Blau 1982): Ascriptive inequality is usually perceived as particularly unjust and high in magnitude.
As a consequence, countries displaying big income and political power differences between ethnic groups are prone
to suffering from higher crime rates, as for example South Africa.
Concerning the theoretical background, it is clear that the three main theories of crime, Becker’s rational choice
theory, the social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay) and Merton’s strain theory, predict a positive impact
from inequality on crime incidence. In the next section I will take a look at the empirical studies that investigated
this link.
2.2.2. Empirical Evidence
In past research, crime has mostly been considered a “social cost of poverty and inequality” (Bourguignon 1999).
Scholars have been convinced that higher inequality causes higher crime levels, however the empirical evidence on
the matter has been mixed. Most of the empirical work has been realized in the form of cross-sectional studies.
More recently, panel data and time series approaches have been added to the scientific discussion.
 Cross-Sectional Studies
On the community, city or state level, many studies have shown that general income inequality, as well as inequality
between races, is a powerful predictor of crimes such as homicides or assault (Blau and Blau 1982, Hsieh and
Pugh 1993, Sampson and Wilson 1995, Morenoff et al. 2001). On the aggregate level, LaFree (1999) and more
recently Nivette (2011) have compared the results of dozens of cross-national studies on the determinants of crime
and concluded that the positive link between inequality and crime rates is one of the most consistent. Some
examples are Krahn et al. (1986), McDonald (1976), Neapolitan (1994), Saridakis (2004) and Fajnzylber et al.
(1998). Although the majority of studies found a significant link, a considerable number of studies was not able to
prove this connection between inequality and crime (Paré 2006, Messner and Rosenfeld 1997). The discrepancies
show that the relationship between inequality and crime is not as clear as it might look at first sight. A possible
explanation why some studies fail to establish a link is suggested by Messner and Rosenfeld (1997). They assume
that an income inequality indicator is not broad enough to capture the concepts of strain and social disorganization.
Another reason for the variations in outcomes could be the small number of observations of the cross-sectional
studies. Given that the total number of countries in the world is only 200 and since for many reliable data is not
available, the scope of a cross-sectional sample is quite limited. To overcome these limitations, researchers have
recently turned towards time series and panel data methodology in order to obtain clearer results.
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 Time-Series and Panel Data Studies
Two of the most extensive studies in this field were realized by Fajnzylber, Lederman and Lozoya (FLL) (2002a
and 2002b). Using panel data of 39 and 37 mostly developed countries for the period from 1965 to 1995, they
show that the positive link between income inequality and crime rates is robust to controlling for country specific
effects as well as for other crime determinants. In contrast, Neumayer (2005) claims that these results are only
valid in the “artificially restricted” (p. 2) sample used by FLL. As soon as he uses a sample of more than 50
countries that also includes developing countries, the indicator of income inequality turns insignificant. According
to Neumayer, the spurious relationship between inequality and crime might be caused by the fact that inequality
is “strongly correlated with country-specific fixed effects such as cultural differences” (2005, p. 2). The contrary
positions of Neumayer (2005) and FLL (2002a, 2002b) illustrate that there has not been found any consensus in
the debate over the role of inequality as crime determinant.
 Special Case: Latin America and the Caribbean
As mentioned in the introduction, the LAC region might be a special case since it displays extraordinarily high
rates of both homicide rates and inequality. This hypothesis is confirmed by Nivette (2011) who mentions that
a Latin America regional dummy variable is a strong predictor of homicide rates in many cross-sectional studies.
Studies that focus exclusively on LAC are rare. The only quantitative study has been conducted by Gaviria and
Pagés (1999) using a sample of only 17 Latin American countries. They could not find any association between
victimization rates and inequality.One additional interesting result of this study that is worth mentioning is that
the authors found that the typical victims of property crimes are indeed members of the middle or upper class
that live in larger cities, just as predicted by the theories. Apart from the work of Gaviria and Pagés, only two
more qualitative studies have been realized: Hojman (2004) presents a qualitative study on the differences of Latin
American studies and concludes that especially diversity, inequality and poverty are conducive to crime. Neapolitan
(1994) indicates that also the history and culture of Latin America has to be taken into account when explaining
variation in homicide rates. Structural and demographics characteristics are often conducive to violence in Latin
America, since they emerged out of a period of colonization and subjugation. Given the fact that there has only
been conducted one quantitative study of inequality and crime in LAC, my thesis clearly fills a gap.
2.2.3. Major Drawbacks of Previous Studies
As already discussed by Neumayer (2005), the results of most previous studies are not reliable because they have
been based on OLS estimations. Since differences in income inequality as well as homicide rates are strongly
correlated with time fixed cultural factors, applying OLS estimation technique will yield biased results. Neumayer
(2005) himself, as soon as he accounts for the unobserved time-invariant variables by using fixed effects estimation,
finds inequality to be not significantly related to crime rates.
However, Neumayer fails to account for another source of possible spurious regression: the possible non-stationarity
of the data. He does not pre-test his variables for stationarity and consequently runs the risk of finding nonsense
correlation between them. Phillips and Moon (2000) already criticized that in panel regression analysis, non-
stationarity received way too little attention in the past. Extensively studied series like the Penn-World Table
feature evident non-stationarity; however this has been completely ignored. The same is true for the study of
homicide rates. Even though the panels used by previous researchers do not have a time dimension as large as in
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my sample, they still should have paid attention to obvious signs of non-stationarity in the data (see also Section
5.4).
In this thesis I will apply a more cautious approach, avoiding the possibility of spurious regression. Hence my
contribution to the academic controversy is empirical: I update the methodology applied by Neumayer (2005)
including pre-tests for stationarity and adjusting the model accordingly. As I avoid the possibility of spurious
regression in my analysis, my hypothesis is that I won’t find any prove for causality running from inequality to
crime. Another methodological innovation is to apply Granger-causality tests to see if there is some sort of causality
running from inequality to crime rates.
Apart from the methodological improvements, I also contribute a more extensive sample. Whereas FLL (2002a)
and Neumayer (2005) used small panels containing only between 80 and 150 observations, my sample contains
approximately 600 observations, even though it contains only countries from LAC.
Using this vast sample as well as the more cautious methodology, my results are more reliable than the findings
of previous research.
3. Historical Background: LAC from 1950 to 2010
After centuries of colonial rule and independence wars, Latin America and the Caribbean experiences a gradual
transition towards democratic governmental forms during the second half of the 20th century. Nevertheless,
parts of the region are severely affected by brutal military regimes and the emergence of drug cartels. Dictators or
military juntas rule in Brazil, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Guatemala, Bolivia is the staging ground for a military coup
and the consequent Marxist revolution led by Che Guevara. After 1970, also in Chile and Uruguay authoritarian
regimes are established, followed by Argentina in 1976 and Panama in 1983. It is said that the USA was involved
in most of the violent coups throughout the region, trying to avoid “Marxist infiltration” of the region as well
as to stop the steady flow of narcotics originating in Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico. Corruption as well as drug
related murders are alarmingly frequent particularly in these countries (Lewis 2006). After the 1980s, almost all the
Latin American countries succeed in abolishing the authoritarian rule and introducing an often slow and arduous
transition to democracy.
Economically, most Latin American countries adopted an inward-looking model of development between the 1930s
and the 1980s (Taylor 1998) and experienced steady growth in the decades after WW II. By 1970 however, serious
doubts emerge if this “Import Substitution Industrialization”-strategy can solve the region’s economic problems.
Economic growth slowed down and led lastly to the “lost decade” of the 1980s when many countries struggled
with a financial debt crisis (Baer 1972). As a reaction, in the following decade of the 1990s, many countries
adopted profound structural reforms introducing a more market-oriented economic system (Gasparini and Lustig
2011). Since 2000, Latin America and the Caribbean has recovered from the previous stagnation and experienced a
steady GDP growth by an average of 1.9 percent (Weisbrot and Ray 2011). By the end of the 20th century, many
countries of the LAC regions experienced a left-swing of the political regimes. Starting with the election of Hugo
Chavez in Venezuela in 1999, other countries such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua all
broke with past neoliberal policies and established governments that focused more on social concerns (Birdsall,
Lustig and McLeod 2011).
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4. Measurement, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
4.1. Crime
4.1.1. Measuring Crime: Homicide Rates
Since not all crimes are equal, it is meaningful to distinguish between the two main types of crime, property crimes
and violent crimes. The theories presented above have different implications regarding the two types of crime.
If income inequality increases, the economic theory predicts an upswing in property crimes since the expected
return from such activities is increased for the poorer part of society. On the other hand, the strain and the social
disorganization theory rather predict an increase in violent crimes as a consequence of increasing social tensions,
pressure and conflicts resulting from increased inequality. Kelly (2000) found some evidence that supports the
sociological theories: His results imply that inequality has no impact on property crime but strongly influences
violent crimes. Already Rosenfeld (1982) obtained similar results: He showed that a measure of relative deprivation
successfully predicts homicide, rape and assault, but not robbery. These empirical results indicate that mostly
violent crimes are affected by changes in inequality. In this thesis I will however not focus on the differences between
violent and property crime, since my crime-proxy is able to capture the extent of both violent and property crime:
Homicide rates. This indicator has been used as a crime proxy in most of the previous research presented in
Section 2.2.2. The official definition of homicide is “unlawful death deliberately inflicted on one person by another
person” (OECD, 2011). Homicide rates are expressed as the number of murders per 100,000 people, since the
size of the population has to be taken into account. 1
In the literature it has been argued that homicide rates are the most reliable indicator of both violent and property
crime in cross-national research (Neapolitan 1997, Nivette 2011) since they have certain characteristics that make
them superior to other indicators of crime (Baten et al., 2014): Most importantly, the definition of homicide or
murder is very clear and fairly stable across cultures and time periods, an advantage for studies that include large
periods of time or a wide cross-section of countries. Secondly, homicides are drastic and incisive incidents, making
it easy to measure their frequency, which in turn results in a lower probability of measurement errors. Another
advantage is that the incidence of homicide is more or less equal across social groups; consequently homicide rates
capture overall crime levels and not the crime levels affecting only parts of the society. It has also been shown that
other crimes are correlated with homicide rates (OECD, 2011). Consequently homicide rates can also be regarded
as a feasible proxy for overall crime rates.
4.1.2. Data Sources
I obtained most of the observations on homicide rates from the Comparative Homicide Time Series assembled
by Martti Lehti and Tapio Lappi-Seppälä (2013) from the Finnish National Research Institute of Legal Policy.
This data set combines the available data from the WHO, UNODC and the Historical Violence Database with
other, minor sources on historical homicide rates. The researchers obtained the data from both public health and
criminal justice records. I added about 20 observations for Mexico (INEGI 2013) as well as 22 observations from
the Tübingen Clioinfra-Database on homicides.
In total, my data set contains 1,665 observations on homicide rates from 37 Latin American and Caribbean
countries for the period from 1893 to 2012. Figure 1 gives an overview over the distribution of the observations
1Homicide rates do not include deaths that result from armed conflicts such as interstate or civil wars.
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over time. For the first half of the twentieth century, there are only few observations available. However, from the
1960s on, observations are available for almost all 37 countries.
The summary statistics of all the variables in my data set as well as the distribution of observations over countries
are presented in Tables 15 and 16 in the appendix.
0
10
20
30
40
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
1900 1950 2000
Year
Figure 1: Distribution of the Observations over Time
4.1.3. Long-Term Trends in Homicide Rates
Latin America and the Caribbean is the region with the second highest mortality rates due to murder in the
world (only Southern Africa has higher murder rates) and violence is one of the main public health concerns
(Briceño-León, Villaveces and Concha-Eastman 2008). Using homicide rates as a proxy of the overall crime level
one can get an idea of how much higher insecurity and crime incidence are in Latin America in comparison to
Europe. Whereas in the UK there are only 1.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, in Honduras and El Salvador
occur as many as 92 and 69 murders respectively (UNODC 2011). The global homicide capitals are all situated
in LAC with the top three being Caracas, Guatemala City and Basseterre (UNODC 2011).
Nevertheless, the distribution of homicides across countries is very heterogeneous and developed differently over
the past decades. Some countries such as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay display very low homicide rates almost on
European level, Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Panama have moderate rates whereas Brazil, Mexico, Honduras and
especially Venezuela and Colombia have extraordinarily high rates (Briceño-León, Villaveces and Concha-Eastman
2008). These findings are confirmed by the data in my sample (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Homicide Trends in Selected Countries (1930-2010)
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Figure 3: Homicide Rates - Total Sample (1890-2010)
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It is hard to summarize the development of crime rates in the past decades, since the temporal trends in LAC vary
widely (Briceño-León, Villaveces and Concha-Eastman 2008).
Looking at the development of homicide rates for all 37 countries in the sample (Figure 3), it seems that in the first
half of the twentieth century, most of the countries experienced a decline of homicide rates whereas after 1960,
homicide rates display a general upswing, resulting in an almost U-shaped pattern. This is not surprising, since
we know that after 1970 economic growth slowed down which probably drove more individuals towards criminal
behavior. However after the adjustments of the 1990s and consequent improvements of living conditions, one
would expect crime rates to decrease, which is not the case.
In order to have a closer look, I now inspect the homicide series by country in Figure 42. Here it is evident that the
majority (24) of the countries experienced an overall increase of homicide rates (Aruba, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Panama, Puerto Rico, Paraguay, El Salvador, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago,
Saint Vincent and Venezuela). Some countries such as Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay display an overall fall of
homicide rates whereas for the other countries there is no clear pattern visible. The prevalence of a trend-like
behavior suggests that the homicide rates series is not stationary.
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Figure 4: Homicide Rates by Country (1890-2010)
The finding that homicide rates have rather increase than decreased in the last century in Latin America is in sharp
contrast to the theory of the civilizing process and to the steady decline of crime in North America and Europe
(Pinker 2011). This exceptional development in Latin America gives rise to concern, since the continent does not
2The abbreviations used are explained in Table 16 in the appendix.
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seem to follow the pleasing development that is occurring in other parts of the world. The question that arises is
why the development in Latin America is so different from other regions. May the extraordinarily high levels of
inequality be a driving force behind this development? In order to further assess this question, I will have a look
at the past development of inequality in the next section.
4.2. Inequality
4.2.1. Measuring Inequality: Gini Index
For my analysis, I will use the most common indicator of inequality, the Gini index. It captures by how much a
wealth or income distribution deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. It varies between 0, which indicates
perfect equality and 100, indicating that all wealth or income is possessed by one individual (World Bank 2014).
The data on inequality was obtained from two main sources: The UNU WIDER World Income Inequality Database
(2008) and the Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set (EHII). The database was replenished with a few
observations from the data set assembled by van Zanden, Baten, Foldvari and van Leeuwen (2012).
When matching the observations on homicide with the available observations on inequality, the sample is reduced
to 27 countries and 702 observations. Figure 5 displays how the observations are now distributed over the time
interval. For the following analysis, I restricted my sample to the years after 1950 due to the lack of observations
for the first half of the twentieth century.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Observations over Time
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4.2.2. Long-Term Trends of Inequality
Previous studies have commonly identified two opposite trends for the development of inequality since 1980: For
the “lost decade”, López-Calva and Lustig (2010) distinguished a sharp increase in inequality throughout the
region. This increase continued as in the 1990s the market-oriented structural reforms most frequently hurt the
poor disproportionally. Since the 2000 however, falling skill premia in the labor market and large-scale cash transfer
programs alongside with increased social spending on education and health led to a decrease in inequality in almost
all countries of the region (Gasparini and Lustig 2011).
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Figure 6: Inequality Trends in Selected Countries (1950-2010)
Argentina for example follows this inverted U-shaped pattern (see Figure 6), with increasing inequality from 1970
until 2000 and a rapid decline afterward. When looking at other countries, it is however hard to discern the same
pattern. For the case of Colombia as well as Ecuador, the inequality seems to fluctuate around a long-term mean
that is about 50.
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Figure 7: Inequality Trends - Total Sample (1890-2010)
For the entire sample (Figure 7), it is hard to discern a common pattern. Just as in the case of homicide rates,
the development of inequality displays wide variations across countries. In some countries inequality has fallen, in
others increased, and in many countries inequality levels just fluctuate around a single mean and no trend behavior
is visible. Overall, the Gini series look more stationary than the homicide rates.
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Figure 8: Combination Plots of Homicide Rates and Gini Index (1890-2010)
Since I am interested in the relationship between inequality and crime, I plot the two series together for each
country. When looking at these combined plots (Figure 8), it seems that the two series are moving together
in many countries. The lines are almost parallel, suggesting a stable long-term relationship between the two
variables. The mere correlation however does not predicate a causal relationship between the two variables. In
order to uncover the true nature of the link between the two phenomena, I have to apply more advanced techniques
which will be described in the following chapter.
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5. Methodology
In this thesis I want to examine if there is a causal link running from inequality to homicide rates in a panel of
Latin American countries. In a (hypothetical) experimental framework that is set up in order to test the impact
of inequality on crime levels one would take several identical countries and “shock” them with different levels of
inequality. In the next step, the crime rates associated with the different levels of inequality could be observed.
Since the countries are otherwise identical, it would be evident that the differences in crime rates are due to the
different levels of inequality. The causal effect could be estimated with the following naive regression:
HomicideRateit = α+ β1 ∗ Inequalityit (1)
In equation (1), time is indicated by t and countries by i, α is a constant and β1 is the coefficient of interest,
capturing the causal effect of inequality on homicide rates. An error term is not necessary, since inequality explains
all of the variation in homicide rates in the experimental context.
Reality however confronts the researcher with a number of heterogeneous countries that display different levels of
inequality and crime where the causal relationship between the two variables is not evident. As described in the
theories presented above, high crime rates can be triggered by a multitude of social and economic factors:
The wealth or income level of a country is important to both determine the potential return from a crime as
well as the potential opportunity cost in form of foregone income. Another indicator of (low) opportunity costs
is unemployment, since it indicates the lack of legal earning opportunities. The direct costs in from of potential
punishment are determined by the juridical system. Turning towards sociological explanations, factors such as
racial heterogeneity, residential instability, education and cultural background, legal and political system as well
as institutional quality of a country can all greatly impact crime rates. These so called “confounding” factors and
the indicators they can be measured with are summarized in Table 2.
Factor Indicator Proxy in Regression
Economic Theory: Factors determining the net return from crime
Direct Benefit: Expected
Return from Crime
Wealth/Income Level GDPpc
Direct Cost: Punishment Severity/Probability ofPunishment
Death Penalty Dummy
Income/Poverty GDPpc
Opportunity Costs:
Foregone Income
Unemployment/Legal Earning
Opportunities
Growth Rate of GDPpc
Sociological, Modernization and Civilizing Process Theories
Strain, Change and
Economic Progress
Ethnic Heterogeneity -
Residential Instability Growth Rate of GDPpc/
Urbanization Rate
Education -
Cultural Background Removed by FE
Political System Partly removed by FE
Institutional Quality Partly removed by FE
Legal System Removed by FE
Modernization/Economic
Progress
GDPpc
Table 2: Confounding Factors
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In terms of the regression equation, the unobserved factors are collected in an error term µit:
HomicideRateit = α+ β1 ∗ Inequalityit + µit (2)
The regression represented in equation (2) would only yield consistent estimates of the causal effect from inequality
to crime if the unobserved factors were uncorrelated with inequality. However, it is very likely that there exists
correlation between inequality and most of the other determinants of crime. Therefore, equation (2) would
overestimate the causal effect from inequality, since it would attribute the effect of the confounding factors
contained in the error term to inequality.
Consequently, if I want to find causal inference between inequality and homicide rates, it is important to control
for confounding factors, e.g. the factors determining crime that are likely to be correlated with inequality.
5.1. Additional Control Variables
The preferred methodology in order to isolate the pure causal effect from inequality on crime would be to include
all of these variables as additional controls in the regression equation. Unfortunately, this is not possible because
for the period contemplated in this thesis, there is hardly any data available. Nevertheless I could obtain data on
GDP per capita (GDPpc) and urbanization rates as well as create a dummy variable for the existence of the death
penalty. These variables are able to proxy many of the unobserved factors.
5.1.1. GDP per Capita
The most important unobserved variable in this context is probably GDP per capita, since it is a good proxy
for several of the confounding factors and certainly correlated with inequality. The hypothesis, that GDPpc and
inequality are linked by a close relationship has already been introduced by Kuznets (1955). He suggested that
the level of inequality increases first at the onset of industrialization and decreases afterward.
When introducing GDPpc into the regression equation, it captures the effect of some of the economic factors
determining the net expected return from criminal activities that have been emphasized in Becker’s economic
model of crime: income level and/or poverty. Wealth increases the amount of material goods available for
theft, which would increase crime. However, wealth also decreases poverty which translates into an increase in
opportunity costs of potential delinquents, leading to a fall of crime. Furthermore, GDPpc also proxies certain
aspects of the social circumstances in a society according to the modernization theory and the theory of civilizing
process. Higher GDPpc implies a higher developmental stage and consequently a higher level of self-control. Due
to these multiple and opposed impacts of GDPpc on crime, the expected sign of the coefficient of GDPpc in the
regression is not obvious. In general, I would expect a negative sign, since the negative impact of GDPpc on crime
from the civilizing process and the higher opportunity costs outweighs the positive impact from a higher expected
return. The effect of GDPpc might even change the sign over time, or at least change its intensity. To model a
changing relationship between GDPpc and crime, I include also the squared GDPpc as explanatory variable in the
regression.
Of course GDPpc is a very primitive and incomplete proxy for the confounding factors mentioned, however, given
the lack of data for the contemplated period, it is a feasible solution. The data on GDPpc has been obtained from
the Maddison Historical GDP database and is measured in constant 1990 international GK$.
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5.1.2. Economic Growth
Not only the level of GDPpc but also its growth rate is an important confounding factor in this context. According to
Kuznets hypothesis (1955), fast growing economies are likely to have high inequality, since the country experiences
a transition from a low to a higher income which occurs only gradually. Therefore, inequality and the growth rate
of GDPpc are correlated.
Again as suggested by the modernization theory, fast growing economies experience disorganization and the
breakdown of traditional ties, as industrialization, technological progress, structural change and urbanization are
reshaping the country. Under these circumstances, individuals may react violently to the challenges and frustrations
of the new, unfamiliar lifestyle. On the other hand, as suggested by the “civilizing process” theory, the rapidly
changing society might present new earning opportunities for many individuals, reduce unemployment and prevent
that individuals engage in criminal activity (Chiricos 1987). So again here, the expected sign is not obvious.
5.1.3. Dummy Variable: Abolition of Death Penalty
Another confounding factor is the potential punishment a delinquent has to face if captured. A more severe
punishment such as the death penalty could put off potential delinquents and consequently lower crime rates.
However, Kelly (2000) shows that death penalty has no correlation with homicide rates but affects only property
crime. I will include in my regression a dummy variable in order to reexamine this relationship. The dummy takes
the value 0 in the years the death penalty was practiced and turns 1 in the years death penalty is not practiced
anymore. The expected sign of this variable is positive, since I expect homicide rates to increase as soon as the
death penalty has been abolished. The data on the practice of the death penalty has been obtained from the
“Death Penalty Worldwide”database (2012) assembled by the Center for International Human Rights. However
since in many LAC countries the death penalty never existed or was not practiced as in other regions of the
world, there are certain caveats to including this variable in my regression. I will therefore also exclude it in some
specifications to avoid potential problems caused by this variable.
5.1.4. Urbanization Rates
Urbanization rates are a good proxy for living conditions, social interactions as well as the stage of industrialization
but are also likely to be correlated with inequality. The data on urbanization rates has been obtained from the
World Bank database and observations are only available from1960 on. Therefore, when including urbanization
rates as additional controls, I lose another decade of observations.
5.2. Fixed Effects Regression
As mentioned above, it would be optimal to include proxies of all the factors determining crime rates in the model.
However, due to data limitations this is not possible and I only have the above mentioned variables at hand. An
alternative approach would be to get at causal effects using an instrumental variable strategy, however since there
is no data available for this early period it is also impossible to find a valid instrument.
The advantage of having at hand a large sample of panel data is that I can partly deal with the omitted variable
bias even though most of the confounding factors are unobserved. Applying a fixed effects estimation strategy, I
am able to control for the unobserved omitted variables that are fixed over time.
Already Bourguignon (2001, p. 26) noted that cross-country differences in inequality and homicide rates are
strongly related to factors that are time invariant. Examples are the cultural background as well as geographical
19
conditions and climate. Also the political system and the quality of institutions are fairly stable over time and
can partly be accounted for using fixed effects estimation: As discussed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), the
quality of institutions is very persistent over time and consequently can be assumed to be constant over the here
contemplated period. Furthermore, the legal system which is very important in this context can be assumed to be
stable over time since a legal system is mainly characterized by its colonial origins (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson
2001; La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer 2007).
Using fixed effects estimation, the compound error term µit from equation (1) can be divided into two parts νi
and εit, where
νi – contains the unobserved factors that impact homicide rates and inequality and are constant over time within
a specific country, for example geography, legal origins or institutional quality. In equation (1), this so called “fixed
effect” was contained in the compound error and consequently caused unwanted correlation between the error
term and the regressor. By taking the fixed effect out of the error term, we avoid this correlation.
εit – contains all the remaining factors that impact homicide rates and vary over time such as GDP, institutions,
poverty rates, jurisdiction (especially monopoly of violence), literacy, democratization and political stability.
Then, the regression equation looks as follows:
HomicideRateit = α+ β1 ∗ Inequalityit + β2 ∗Xit + νi + εit (3)
with Xitbeing the additional control variables.
We can now get rid of the fixed effect by applying the within transformation. This way, some of the very important
unobserved-but-fixed omitted variables can be accounted for. Nevertheless there still remain some confounding
factors unaccounted for.
5.3. Remaining Unobserved Factors
Now that both the time-fixed unobserved variables as well as the observed confounders (GDP growth, urbanization,
and death penalty) are accounted for, there remains only little unobserved variation in the error term. One useful
additional control variable would be an indicator of educational attainment in order to capture the effects from
education and the overall progress of society. Obtaining reliable data on education for periods as early as the 1950s
for LAC is difficult and thus I am not able to include them in my regression. Another variable that I would like
to include but am not able to is an indicator of the ethnic composition of the population, since according to the
disorganization theory, ethnic heterogeneity is a determinant of high crime rates. Including these control variables
could be addressed in further research. Another control variable used by previous studies is poverty; however studies
by Baily (1984) and Kennedy et al. (1996) found that indicators of relative deprivation (inequality) are stronger
predictors of homicide and violence than indicators of absolute deprivation such as poverty. Once inequality is
controlled for, poverty no longer plays a role (Blau and Blau 1982). Hence there is no need to include poverty
into my regression.
5.4. Spurious Regression in Panel Data
When working with time series data, spurious regression is a well-known phenomenon and testing for unit roots is
common practice. In the field of panel data analysis however, the topic of non-stationarity has long been ignored
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and tests for unit roots have only been around for about a decade (Baltagi and Kao 2000). Nevertheless, when
working with panel data, it is just as important to take into account the potential problems that can arise from
non-stationarity.
Even if the cross-sections display only simple trending mechanisms, spurious regression can be a problem and the
probability of finding a nonsense correlation is very high (Noriega and Ventosa-Santaularia 2007). Entorf (1997)
already showed that even applying fixed effects estimation to non-stationary panels results in nonsense regression.
The phenomenon of spurious regression however only occurs if the non-stationary behavior is present in both
dependent and explanatory variables. If only one of the variable groups displays a deterministic or stochastic
trend, the spurious regression disappears.
In standard panel data analysis, non-stationarity and spurious regressions are not of concern since they mostly
deal with samples that have large N (number of countries) and small T (length of the time series) (Baltagi 2005,
p.237). In panels with slightly larger time dimension however, spurious regression can already appear. It has been
shown that the presence of deterministic or stochastic trends in the data could lead to spurious regression and give
misleading results even for time dimensions as small as T=25 (Noriega and Ventosa-Santaularia 2007). Since my
sample contains a large number of time periods (T50) and only a smaller number of countries (N22), it is crucial
to check for non-stationarity before applying any econometric regression technique. Previous papers (Neumayer
2005, Fajnzylber et al. 2002a and 2002b) failed to do so.
5.5. Unit Root Tests
In the descriptive analysis of the development of homicide rates and inequality in Section 4 I already mentioned
that the series display characteristics of non-stationarity. Consequently it is important to pre-test them for their
order of integration to avoid spurious regression. In the panel case, to determine the order of integration is not as
straightforward as in the case of time series, since each cross-section might have a different order. Nevertheless
there exist several tests that combine the p-values from the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests from each cross-sectional
unit. Since my panel is unbalanced, I have to use the Maddala-Wu test, the only test not requiring a strongly
balanced panel. The Null hypothesis (H0) of the test is that all the cross-sectional units contain a unit root against
the alternative that at least one of them is stationary.
To test if the series are stationary, I proceeded in two steps: In the first step, I used the Akaike-Information-criterion
(AIC) to select the optimal lag length for each cross-section. Then I continued to apply the Maddala-Wu test on
the panel data, using the entire range of optimal lag lengths determined in step 1.
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5.5.1. Homicide Rates
As already suggested in the descriptive part, the plots of the homicide rates of the total sample did not look
stationary but rather followed a trend-like behavior (see Figure 9). Now, looking at the restricted sample that
includes only the years after 1950, this impression is confirmed.
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Graphs by country
Figure 9: Homicide Rates by Country (1950-2010)
In Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay, the series seems to have a time independent mean; however, the observations
do not fluctuate but rather meander. This indicates the presence of a unit root. In almost all remaining countries,
homicide rates follow either a clear upward or downward trend that looks deterministic in some (Ecuador, Brazil,
Costa Rica) and stochastic in other cases (Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica). To account for possible
non-linearities in the relationship between homicide rates and its determinants and to stabilize the variance of the
series, I transformed the homicide rates into log form prior to the testing. The test results of the unit root tests
rates are summarized in Table 3.
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Variable Trend? # of lags P-Value Conclusion
Ln(HomicideRate) No 4 0.9995 Cannot reject H0
Ln(HomicideRate) No 3 0.9651 Cannot reject H0
Ln(HomicideRate) No 2 0.9862 Cannot reject H0
Ln(HomicideRate) No 1 0.0000 Reject H0
Ln(HomicideRate) Yes 4 0.9995 Cannot reject H0
Ln(HomicideRate) Yes 3 0.0000 Reject H0
Ln(HomicideRate) Yes 2 0.9619 Cannot reject H0
Ln(HomicideRate) Yes 1 0.0000 Reject H0
∆Ln(HomicideRate) No 4 0.0003 Reject H0
∆Ln(HomicideRate) No 3 0.0000 Reject H0
∆Ln(HomicideRate) No 2 0.0000 Reject H0
∆Ln(HomicideRate) No 1 0.0000 Reject H0
Table 3: Unit Root tests for Homicide Rates
Using 4, 3 or 2 lags, I cannot reject the H0 of the presence of a unit root; but when using only one lag, H0 is
rejected. However when checking the individual test results, I can see that only in one case (Paraguay), the Null
hypothesis was rejected. Therefore it is not reasonable to assume that the homicide rates are stationary across the
panel. I continue by including a linear trend into the underlying regressions, since the ocular inspection indicated
that there might be some sort of linear trend present in the data. Again, the results are mixed and it is not possible
to reject the H0 with certainty. The homicide rates are clearly integrated of some order. In the next step I took
the first differences of the series and repeated the unit root tests. For the case of the first differences, I am able
to reject the Null hypothesis in all the cases. Consequently it is reasonable to assume that the first differences are
stationary. The homicide series is integrated of order 1.
5.5.2. Gini Index
Ocular inspection of the Gini series revealed that they look rather stationary. In order to confirm this impression,
I proceeded in the same manner as described for homicide rates. The results are summarized in Table 4.
Variable Trend? # of lags P-Value Conclusion
Gini Index No 4 0.0000 Reject H0
Gini Index No 3 0.6594 Cannot reject H0
Gini Index No 2 0.0670 Reject H0
Gini Index No 1 0.0001 Reject H0
Table 4: Unit Root tests for Gini Index
In 3 out of 4 cases it is possible to reject the Null hypothesis of non-stationarity of all the cross-sections. Here it
is hard to make a conclusion, since the panel-unit-root-tests do not have a clear interpretation. When checking
the individual augmented Dickey Fuller-tests for the case of 3 lags, I can see that in most cases, the H0 was
rejected. Since in the other cases, the H0 of the Maddala-Wu test was rejected, I assume that the Gini series is
stationary, albeit under strong reservations: In some of the cross-sectional units, there is some kind of trending
behavior present. I will keep this in mind for the following analysis.3.
3Since it is possible that both the homicide rates and the Gini index are integrated of order 1, I tested for the presence of
cointegration vectors between the two variables. The results (not reported) suggest that there is no cointegration present. Therefore
I continued with the standard procedure of panel data analysis.
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5.5.3. GDP per capita
Before including GDP per capita into my regression, I have to make sure that it is in its stationary form. In order
to test for the order of integration, I applied the same methodology as for homicide rates.
Variable Trend? # of lags P-Value Conclusion
GDPpc No 4 1.0000 Cannot reject H0
GDPpc No 3 0.0000 Reject H0
GDPpc No 2 1.0000 Cannot reject H0
GDPpc No 1 1.0000 Cannot reject H0
GDPpc Yes 4 0.0000 Reject H0
GDPpc Yes 3 0.9998 Cannot reject H0
GDPpc Yes 2 1.0000 Cannot reject H0
GDPpc Yes 1 0.9004 Cannot reject H0
∆GDPpc No 4 0.0000 Reject H0
∆GDPpc No 3 0.0129 Reject H0
∆GDPpc No 2 0.0437 Reject H0
∆GDPpc No 1 0.0000 Reject H0
Table 5: Unit Root tests for GDPpc
The results indicate that the GDP-levels series is clearly non-stationary. Consequently I proceed by including a
trend into the underlying regression, but still am unable to reject the H0 with certainty. When repeating the test
for the first differences, I can finally reject the Null hypothesis in all the cases and therefore assume that the series
is now stationary.
5.5.4. Growth Rate of GDPpc
The next variable I am going to test for stationarity is the growth rate of GDPpc. Again I applied the same
methodology and the results are as follows:
Variable Trend? # of lags P-Value Conclusion
GDPpcGrowthRate No 4 0.0000 Reject H0
GDPpcGrowthRate No 3 0.0221 Reject H0
GDPpcGrowthRate No 2 0.0039 Reject H0
GDPpcGrowthRate No 1 10.0000 Reject H0
Table 6: Unit Root tests for GDPpc Growth Rate
I can clearly reject the Null hypothesis at all common significance levels. The growth rate series is stationary.
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5.5.5. Urbanization Rate
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Figure 10: Long-Term Urbanization Rates (1960-2010)
Ocular inspection (see Figure 10) of the urbanization rates indicates that there is probably a common underlying
positive trend, since basically all urbanization rates are increasing steadily over time. In the first specification of
the Maddala-Wu test without modeling a trend I cannot reject the Null hypothesis in 3 out of 4 cases. When
including the trend the result is almost the same. Even when transforming the series into first differences I am still
not able to reject the Null hypothesis. The urbanization series is probably integrated of some order higher than 1.
Variable Trend? # of lags P-Value Conclusion
UrbanizationRate No 4 0.8403 Cannot reject H0
UrbanizationRate No 3 0.1699 Cannot reject H0
UrbanizationRate No 2 0.2910 Cannot reject H0
UrbanizationRate No 1 0.0118 Reject H0
UrbanizationRate Yes 4 1.0000 Cannot reject H0
UrbanizationRate Yes 3 0.7239 Cannot reject H0
UrbanizationRate Yes 2 0.99996 Cannot reject H0
UrbanizationRate Yes 1 0.9999 Cannot reject H0
∆UrbanizationRate No 4 0.8918 Cannot reject H0
∆UrbanizationRate No 3 0.4247 Cannot reject H0
∆UrbanizationRate No 2 0.2096 Cannot reject H0
∆UrbanizationRate No 1 0.9960 Cannot reject H0
Table 7: Unit Root tests for Urbanization Rates
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6. Results
Since there are non-stationary variables among the independent variables and my dependent variable is integrated
of order 1 as well, this leaves me three different valid model specifications:
a) All variables in their stationary form
b) Explanatory variables stationary, dependent variable non-stationary
c) Explanatory variables non-stationary, dependent variable stationary
Any other combination of variables would lead to spurious results. In options a) and b), I could only include the
growth rate of GDP as control variables, since the other variables are not stationary and/or cannot be transformed
easily into a stationary form. Since it allows me to include the maximum number of control variables, specification
c) is the most appropriate one. In the following I will present and discuss the results of all three models.
6.1. Model a)
The first specification I will use to estimate the relationship between inequality and homicide rates employs all the
variables in their stationary form. Since GDP per capita is not stationary, it is not possible to include the level of
GDP but only the changes. However, the changes contain information that is very similar to the growth rate of
GDP. To avoid multicollinearity, I include only the growth rate of GDP as control variable. It expresses the relative
instead of the absolute changes. Urbanization rates cannot be included either, since the series is integrated of
some order higher than 1 and the coefficient of the changes of the changes of the urbanization rate would not
have any meaningful interpretation; therefore I decided not to include them into the regression.
The results of the regression are displayed in Table 8.4
In column (1), I estimated a simple OLS model without any further controls. Here, the coefficient of the Gini index
is positive, indicating that higher inequality is generally associated with higher increases in homicide rates. The
effect is however very small in magnitude and not significant. When controlling for the growth rate of GDP, the
significance and sign of the index do not change. The coefficient of the growth rate of GDP is positive, indicating
that in fast growing economies the homicide rate is expected to grow more than in others. However this effect is
not significant either.
As discussed above, the results of a simple OLS regression are probably biased, since the unobserved but time-fixed
variation is unaccounted for. Therefore I apply fixed effects estimation to avoid this bias (columns (3) and (4),
but in the result all the variables remain insignificant and the signs do not change.
4The number of observations has been reduced due to first differencing and because the additional control variables are not available
for all the observations previously contained in the sample.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆Ln(HomicideRate)
Methodology OLS OLS FE FE
Gini Index 0.00123 0.00118 0.00171 0.00168
(0.00209) (0.00210) (0.00286) (0.00287)
GDPpcGrowthRate 0.132 0.150
(0.278) (0.288)
Constant -0.0451 -0.0448 -0.0687 -0.0696
(0.103) (0.103) (0.141) (0.141)
Observations 496 496 496 496
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
# of countries 21 21
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Results Model a)
These first results indicate that there is no direct causality running from inequality measured with the Gini index to
homicide rates. The results are in contrast to the findings of Fajnzylber et al. (2002a, b), which is not surprising
since the sample used by them was very restricted, they fail to control for omitted but time-fixed effects and did
not check their data for non-stationary behavior. Using the other two remaining model specifications, I will now
check the robustness of my results.
6.2. Model b)
In the second specification, I will use the dependent variable in its non-stationary level form and the explanatory
variables in stationary form. As before, I can only include the Gini coefficient and the growth rate of GDP
as (stationary) explanatory variables. Using standard OLS estimation (Table 9, column (1)), the coefficient of
inequality presents very high significance and magnitude as well as the “correct” sign. As the Gini index increases
by 1 unit, homicide rates are expected to increase by 4 percent. When controlling for the growth rate of GDPpc,
the results do not change. This effect can however not be interpreted as causal but is obviously overestimated
due to the omitted variable bias discussed above. When accounting for the unobserved but time-fixed variation
between countries by using fixed effects regression (column (3)), the coefficient is still significant and positive but
considerably diminished in magnitude. A 1 unit increase in the Gini index now leads to an expected increase in
homicide rates by 1.8 percent ceteris paribus. This effect is larger than the effect found by Fajnzylber et al. (2002,
p. 16, column (1)) of 0.0069. The large magnitude is probably due to the lack of additional control variables.
Consequently, the effect of the omitted variables is still attributed to the Gini coefficient. However, when including
growth rate of GDP as control variable in column (3), the coefficient of the Gini index unexpectedly increases.
This would indicate the presence of a negative omitted variable bias and is implausible.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Ln(HomicideRate)
Methodology OLS OLS FE FE GMM GMM
Gini Index 0.0404*** 0.0415*** 0.0181*** 0.0189*** 0.00308 0.00300
(0.00610) (0.00730) (0.00423) (0.00477) (0.00272) (0.00273)
GDPpcGrowthRate -1.535 -0.784 0.138
(0.970) (0.479) (0.338)
L.Ln(HomicideRate) 0.938*** 0.939***
(0.0174) (0.0174)
Constant 0.401 0.397 1.493*** 1.494*** 0.0115 0.0122
(0.300) (0.360) (0.208) (0.235) (0.131) (0.131)
Observations 619 496 619 496 496 496
R-squared 0.066 0.065 0.030 0.037
# of countries 21 21 21 21
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Results Model b)
The evidence obtained when using model specification b) suggests that there is a positive correlation between
the extent of income inequality and the incidence of homicides. However, these results have to be viewed with
caution. When testing for unit roots, it was not possible to assure that the Gini series is stationary. Consequently,
when using the non-stationary form of homicide rates and the (potentially) non-stationary Gini series, the results
might be driven by spurious regression.
One possibility of testing if the results are driven by the presence of trends in both inequality and crime, is to
account for the inertial properties of crime by including a lagged dependent variable in a dynamic panel regression.
Neumayer (2005) shows that the incidence of crime presents high persistence. Criminals might base their decision
on current year’s behavior on information from the past years. The resulting model including the lagged homicide
rate as an explanatory variable has to be estimated with the systems generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The GMM estimator deals with the potential endogeneity of
the lagged dependent variable.
When including the lagged value of homicide rates, the coefficient of the Gini index shrinks dramatically in
magnitude and loses significance, indicating that once controlling for the inertia properties of crime, inequality
does not longer contribute explanatory power to the model. This result does not change when including the GDP
growth as control variable. The only significant variable is the lagged homicide rate, indicating that crime in Latin
America is very persistent: The crime rate of the past period is a very good predictor future crime incidence. Once
controlling for this trend-like behavior, there is no longer any relation between crime and inequality.
This result indicates that the significance of the inequality indicator in column (1) to (3) is probably driven by
the commonality of stochastic or deterministic trends in both the Gini index and the homicide series. I conclude
that there is no robust correlation between inequality and homicide rates. The evidence obtained with model
specification b) is in line with the ones from a).
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6.3. Model c)
The third model specification is the most feasible one because it features one main advantage over the previous
models: By using the (stationary) first differences of homicide rates, I am able to include all the additional
(non-stationary) control variables, accounting for most of the unobserved variation. As the homicide rates are
used in their stationary form, the possible presence of any deterministic or stochastic trends in the explanatory
variables does not lead to spurious results.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆Ln(HomicideRate)
Methodology OLS OLS OLS
Gini Index 0.00123 0.00143
(0.00209) (0.00237)
GDPpc 1.15e-05
(2.26e-05)
(GDPpc)2 -4.34e-10
(1.58e-09)
GDPpcGrowthRate 0.207
(0.306)
AbolitionDummy 0.00336
(0.0387)
UrbanizationRate -0.000618
(0.000815)
∆Gini Index -0.00155
(0.00246)
Constant -0.0451 0.0152 -0.0667
(0.103) (0.0115) (0.136)
Observations 496 496 433
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.005
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: Results Model c), Part I
In column (1) of Table 10, the changes of homicide rates have been regressed on the Gini index using simple OLS.
As expected, the coefficient of inequality is not significant, indicating no correlation of inequality and the growth
rate of homicide rates. Now one might think that the level of inequality does not an impact on the change of
crime, but that an increase in inequality should lead to an increase in crime. Therefore repeat the OLS regression
using the change of the Gini index as explanatory variable in column (2). Still, the coefficient remains insignificant
and even displays the “wrong” sign. In a third attempt I include now all of the potential confounders, this way
accounting for omitted variable bias, but the relationship between inequality and crime does not become significant
(column (3)). Surprisingly, none of the variables displays significance. When using the stationary form of homicide
rates, none of the variables that are supposed to determine crime rates is correlated with crime.
Again, the OLS results might be biased due to the unaccounted variation of the time-invariant country character-
istics. Therefore I repeat the analysis applying fixed effects estimation.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ∆Ln(HomicideRate) Ln(HomicideRate)
Methodology FE FE FE FE FE
Gini Index 0.00171 0.000908 0.000356 0.000322 -0.00332
(0.00286) (0.00290) (0.00349) (0.00347) (0.00468)
GDPpc 4.43e-05 6.85e-05 6.86e-05 0.000135*
(3.48e-05) (5.20e-05) (5.19e-05) (6.98e-05)
(GDPpc)2 -1.90e-09 -3.41e-09 -3.45e-09 -1.03e-08**
(2.21e-09) (2.98e-09) (2.97e-09) (4.01e-09)
GDPpcGrowthRate 0.156 0.156 -0.613
(0.322) (0.321) (0.432)
UrbanizationRate -0.00231 -0.00236 0.0287***
(0.00291) (0.00287) (0.00391)
AbolitionDummy -0.00603 0.497***
(0.0573) (0.0769)
Constant -0.0687 -0.202 -0.104 -0.104 0.0119
(0.141) (0.169) (0.193) (0.193) (0.259)
Observations 496 496 433 433 433
R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.364
# of countries 21 21 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Results Model c), Part II
As evident from column (1) Table 11, the results do not change. Even when including different groups of control
variables (columns (2) to (4)), none of the explanatory variables shows a significant correlation with the stationary
form of homicide rates. I repeated the regression analysis replacing the Gini levels by the first differences, but the
results were the same (not reported).
Once more I conclude that there is no impact from inequality on crime rates. The fact that the additional
control variables are not significant either is however quite surprising. Basically all previous studies (for example
Fajnzylber (2002a and 2002b) and Neumayer (2005)) did find significant relationships between homicide rates and
the additional control variables. Since many of the additional control variables are not stationary either, I suspect
that their significant results are likewise driven by spurious regression.
For illustrative purposes, I estimated the same fixed effects model as specified in column (3) but using the levels
of the homicide rates as dependent variable, reproducing the regressions conducted by Neumayer (2005). In this
model specification both the dependent and independent variables are potentially integrated, which might lead to
spurious regression. And indeed, in this regression almost all the additional control variables are significant! Also
the signs are consistent with theory: Just as suggested by Shelley’s adaption of the modernization theory (1981),
initially an increasing GDP is related to an upswing in homicide rates. However after reaching a certain threshold,
the correlation turns negative, as indicated by the negative sign of (GDPpc)2. For example, Argentina reaches
this threshold in the 1960s, Brazil in the 1980s. Higher urbanization is significantly associated with higher crime
rates, giving support to the theory of social disorganization. As expected, the abolition of the death penalty is
related to an increase in crime as well, just as predicted by the economic theory of crime. The only control variable
not significant in this specification is the growth rate of GDPpc.
None of the significant effects can be interpreted as causal since they are clearly driven by the commonality of
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stochastic or deterministic trends in the dependent and explanatory variables. All the variables employed display
some kind of increasing time trend, which might be mistaken as correlation by the model. The coefficient of the
Gini index however is not significant, indicating that once controlling for confounding factors, the significance that
was still present in Table b), column (2) and (3) vanishes. This result is exactly the same as obtained by Neumayer
(2005) for his sample including countries from all over the world but less time periods.
The three models estimated in this section suggest that there is no causality running from inequality to crime
incidence. I could also show that it is possible to reproduce the results of Neumayer (2005) with my sample
when using the model specification that yields potentially spurious results. When using a model specification that
eliminates the possibility of spurious regression however, the coefficient of inequality is never significant. To assess
the robustness of this finding I will now proceed to estimate the model in the preferred specification (Table 11,
column (4)) for several subsets of the sample.
6.4. Robustness Checks
In Latin American history, we can distinguish three periods that are each characterized by a particular economic
strategy. From 1950 until 1975, most countries adopted an Import Substitution-strategy with mixed results. From
1975 until 1990, as military juntas and dictators led the region, economic growth slowed down and macroeconomic
problems such as high debt severely affected the region during the “lost decade of the 1980s. Afterwards, from 1990
until 2010, most countries were able to introduce a stable democratic system and adopted a more market-oriented
economic strategy, resulting in sustained economic growth. Since the three periods are characterized by completely
different economic and political conditions, it is possible that the link between inequality and crime is not constant
over the period examined (1950-2010) but changes over time. Maybe the link holds only in one of the periods
and is distorted by the macroeconomic and political conditions in the others, for example by the violent rule of
a military regime. Estimating the model for the entire period from 1950 from 2010 might therefore not reveal
the true link between the two phenomena. To allow for a changing relationship between inequality and crime
over time, I estimate the model separately for each period. I use the same fixed-effect model in the preferred
specification as in column (4) of Table 11.
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆Ln(HomicideRate)
Methodology FE FE FE
Gini Index -0.00826 0.00774 0.000206
(0.0133) (0.0134) (0.00308)
GDPpc 0.000432 0.000167 7.84e-05
(0.000507) (0.000240) (5.63e-05)
(GDPpc)2 -1.05e-08 -8.05e-09 -3.38e-09
(2.97e-08) (1.31e-08) (2.86e-09)
GDPpcGrowthRate 0.678 0.576 -0.760***
(1.936) (0.735) (0.280)
UrbanizationRate -0.0541 0.00541 -0.00625
(0.0461) (0.0174) (0.00485)
Constant 1.594 -1.330 0.127
(1.689) (1.266) (0.342)
Time Period 1950-1975 1975-1990 1990-2010
Observations 72 132 211
R-squared 0.044 0.020 0.048
# of countries 14 16 17
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Results Robustness Checks I
The results of these robustness checks (see Table 12) are in line with my previous findings. Even when allowing for
a different relationship between inequality and crime in each period, the coefficient of the inequality indicator is
never significant. Interestingly, in the last period, the negative coefficient of the growth rate of GDP is significant,
supporting the claims of the “civilizing process” theory: the fast growing economy offers new earning opportunities
for many individuals and hence less people engage in criminal activity.
Lastly, it is also a possibility that the relationship between inequality and crime is not the same in all the countries.
The region of LAC includes very heterogeneous countries that apart from their geographical and political disparities
also experienced diverse trends of homicide rates and inequality. By dividing the LAC region into two sub-regions,
I allow the relationship between inequality and crime to differ between the two. Column (1) of Table 13 estimates
the preferred model specification including only South American countries, whereas column (2) repeats the analysis
for Central America and the Caribbean.
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES ∆Ln(HomicideRate)
Methodology FE FE
Gini Index 0.00207 -0.00305
(0.00387) (0.00628)
∆GDPpc 9.58e-06 8.63e-05
(6.54e-05) (8.95e-05)
(GDPpc)2 1.86e-10 -5.06e-09
(3.81e-09) (4.54e-09)
GDPpcGrowthRate -0.352 1.416**
(0.318) (0.707)
UrbanizationRate -0.000541 -0.00121
(0.00369) (0.00591)
Constant -0.118 -0.0450
(0.237) (0.321)
Region SOUTH CENTRAL+
CARIBBEAN
Observations 230 203
R-squared 0.011 0.032
#of countries 8 10
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13: Results Robustness Checks II
Not surprisingly, the results are the same as above. Again, the Gini index is insignificant in both sub-regions,
supporting the previous conclusion that there is no causality running from inequality to crime. For Central
America and the Caribbean, the growth rate of GDP is significant but this time positive. This evidence favors
the modernization theory that predicts that in fast changing society, individuals might react violently to the new
challenges.
All the analysis conducted so far clearly suggests that there is no causal link present between inequality and crime.
One advantage of having panel data at hand is that I can apply various methods of testing for causality between
inequality and homicide rates. After applying standard panel data analysis above I will now move towards a method
that has been developed in the context of time series - Granger-causality testing - to check if my previous results
are confirmed by this alternative methodology.
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7. Granger-Causality Tests
In the field of time series, the notion of causality is that the cause has to happen before the consequence. This
concept of causality is also called Granger-causality: A variable X is said to Granger-cause Y if we are able to
predict Y better when using the past history of X, even given the past of Y. The standard procedure to test for
Granger-causality in time series is to estimate a VAR model of the form
HomicideRatet =
p∑
k=1
(βk ∗HomicideRatet−k) +
p∑
k=0
(θk ∗ Inequalityt−k) + εt
and then test for the joint significance of the θk.
In a panel data context however, it is important to pay attention to cross-sectional heterogeneity. The first kind
of heterogeneity is given by the permanent cross-sectional disparities. These can be accounted for by allowing
for country-specific intercepts as for example in fixed effects estimation (Erdil and Yetkiner 2009). Secondly and
more importantly, one should also allow for heterogeneous regression coefficients θk. To take into account both
sources of heterogeneity, I decided to perform Granger-causality tests for each cross-section separately, obtaining
the corresponding p-values. As a consequence, 7 countries had to be dropped from the sample due to an insufficient
number of observations for a regression including lagged values.
Another issue in my data is the non-stationarity. Since at least one of the variables is known to be integrated of
some order and there is no cointegrating vector between them, the standard asymptotic theory is not applicable
and I have to apply the alternative procedure proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995): a lag augmented VAR in
levels. Here is how I proceeded: Using the Phillips-Perron test, I determined the maximum order of integration
dmax of the Gini index and homicide rate series for each cross-section. dmax is equal to 0 or 1 in all the cross
sections. Secondly, according to the AIC, I decided on the optimum lag length q of the underlying VAR, again
for each cross-section. Then I added dmax additional lags to the optimum length, estimated the VAR(q+dmax)
and finally tested the joint significance of the first q lags, all these steps for each cross-section separately. The
additional dmax lags are not included in the significance test; it is only needed to fix up the asymptotics. The test
has the Null hypothesis that the Gini index does not Granger cause homicide rates. The resulting test statistic
follows a standard asymptotic chi-square distribution. The corresponding p-values are reported in Table 14.
Country # of lags (q+dmax) p-value Conclusion
Argentina 3 0.6440 Cannot reject H0
Brazil 2 0.8399 Cannot reject H0
Chile 5 0.3264 Cannot reject H0
Colombia 3 0.6566 Cannot reject H0
Costa Rica 2 0.1376 Cannot reject H0
Dominican Republic 2 0.2034 Cannot reject H0
Ecuador 4 0.1168 Cannot reject H0
Jamaica 2 0.8434 Cannot reject H0
Mexico 3 0.1198 Cannot reject H0
Puerto Rico 2 0.7397 Cannot reject H0
El Salvador 2 0.4794 Cannot reject H0
Trinidad and Tobago 2 0.0012 Reject H0@ 5%
Uruguay 3 0.6051 Cannot reject H0
Venezuela 2 0.5539 Cannot reject H0
Table 14: Granger-Causality Tests
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Only in the case of Trinidad and Tobago is it possible to reject the Null hypothesis of Granger-non-causality. For
all the other countries there is no evidence for Granger-causality from inequality to homicide rates. To obtain one
single result for the entire panel, I followed a meta-analysis approach suggested by Emirmahmutoglu and Kose
(2010). By combining the p-values according to the formula proposed by Fisher (1932), this approach allows to
merge the results from independent but identical Granger-causality tests into one single test statistic:
λ = −2 ∗
N∑
i=
ln(pi) = 38.1048
pi - p-value corresponding to the Wald statistic obtained from Granger-causality test for the ith country
N - number of cross-sections (countries) remaining in the sample (=14)
This combined test statistic λ follows a chi-square distribution with 2N degrees of freedom. The value of the test
statistic is equal to 38.1048. The critical value of a chi-square distribution with 28 degrees of freedom and an alpha
of 0.05 is 41.337. Since the test statistic does not fall into the rejection area, the panel Granger-causality test fails
to reject the H0 that the Gini index does not Granger-cause homicide rates. The conclusion that inequality does
not Granger-cause crime rates supports my previous findings.
8. Conclusions
In this thesis I have applied panel data estimation techniques as well as Granger-causality tests on an unbal-
anced panel of Latin American countries to check for causality running from inequality to homicide rates. The
major difference to previous studies, apart from a larger sample, is that I pre-tested my variables for potential
non-stationarity. Since unit roots are present in the data, estimating a model in levels as performed by other
researchers (Neumayer 2005, FLL. 2002a and 2002b) is likely to result in spurious regression. Using models that
avoid the possibility of spurious regression, I cannot find any significant correlation between inequality and crime
rates. The additional control variables included, GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita, urbanization rate
and a dummy variable indicating the abolition of the death penalty, are not significant either. Also the tests for
Granger-causality lead me to the conclusion that there is no Granger-causality running from inequality to crime.
Additionally, the analysis showed that crime incidence has strong inertia properties such as high persistence. In
a dynamic panel regression, the lagged value of homicide rates has very high significance. This high persistence
property of crime calls for early intervention to prevent long lasting crime waves.
My primary result that there is no significant impact from inequality on crime is in line with the findings of
Neumayer (2005) - even though I used a different methodology - and in sharp contrast to previous studies that
did find a significant impact from inequality on crime such as FLL 2002a and 2002b. Since these studies did not
take into account the probability of spurious regression, the significance of their results is probably driven by the
commonality of stochastic and/or deterministic trends in both the inequality and the crime indicator. Also the fact
that I cannot find significant correlation between the additional control variables and the homicide rates whereas
Neumayer (2005) did might be explained by the presence of spurious regression in Neumayer’s analysis.
The finding that there is no significant impact from inequality on crime detectable can lead to different conclusions.
The first and obvious conclusion would be that there is indeed no impact from inequality on crime and that the
underlying theories predicting a positive link are simply mistaken. Individuals suffering from strain might not be
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driven towards criminal behavior, income heterogeneity might not favor the process of social disorganization and/or
the income differential between social classes might not determine the net return from criminal activity.
A second and maybe more plausible conclusion is that the Gini index, as suggested by Messner and Rosenfeld
(1997), fails to capture the complex social concepts of strain and social disorganization. Likewise, the index might
not be a good proxy for the expected net return from crime. Therefore, using the Gini index as the only indicator
of inequality it is impossible to find a significant impact on crime. In future analysis, it would be reasonable to use
broader indicators of inequality and the expected benefits of crime to reassess the relationship between inequality
and crime.
However, if we believe that the Gini index is a suitable proxy for inequality, then there is also a third conclusion
possible: There is a causal link form inequality to crime, however not in Latin America. Due to the particular
characteristics such as colonial history, a culture of masculinity as well as extraordinarily high inequality, LAC might
be a special case. What is true for Europe or Africa might not hold here. As other studies employed samples
including countries from all over the world whereas I focused on LAC, the results might not be comparable. To get
reliable results on the relation of inequality and crime in the entire world, it is necessary to apply a methodology
that takes into account the possibility of non-stationarity on an all-encompassing sample. Given these points, I
stick with the third conclusion and for now assume that inequality is not a major determinant of crime in LAC,
and neither are any of the other variables that have been included in my analysis: GDP levels, economic growth
or urbanization. I found some weak evidence that economic growth might be related to homicide rates, however
neither sign nor significance are consistent across different model specifications.
The finding that neither economic development nor decreasing inequality have a significant impact on crime rates
is bad news, since it implies that in Latin America, crime rates will not automatically decrease over time as it has
happened in Europe and North America (Pinker 2011), even if the countries keep experiencing economic growth.
It also implies that the quest for the true determinants of crime in LAC is far from over. To understand and
lower crime rates in Latin America, we have to find new theories and new approaches, since the theories developed
so far cannot explain what we observe. Maybe factors that are more difficult to measures such as a culture of
masculinity, the presence of drug gangs as well as the availability of firearms and the use of alcohol are able to
explain the variation of crime rates across Latin America. To find measures or proxies of these factors and analyze
their relationship to homicide rates is an interesting task for future research.
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10. Appendix
Table 15: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
HomicideRate 15.977 14.875 0.75 89.5
Gini Index 48.902 5.803 28.3 65.5
GDPpc 5336.593 2736.958 1259 14488
GDPpcGrowthRate 0.016 0.042 -0.159 0.166
UrbanizationRate 56.28 21.045 8.534 98.959
AbolitionDummy 0.826 0.38 0 1
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Table 16: Abbreviations of country names and number of observations per country in the final sample
Abbreviation Country Name # of Observations
abw Aruba 0
arg Argentina 35
atg Antigua and Barbuda 0
bhs Bahamas 0
blz Belize 0
bol Bolivia 8
bra Brazil 31
brb Barbados 0
chl Chile 47
col Colombia 43
cri Costa Rica 41
cub Cuba 3
cym Cayman Islands 0
dma Dominica 0
dom Dominican Republic 38
ecu Ecuador 45
grd Grenada 0
gtm Guatemala 28
guy Guyana 0
hnd Honduras 13
hti Haiti 0
jam Jamaica 27
kna St. Kitts and Nevis 0
lca St. Lucia 0
mex Mexico 46
nic Nicaragua 14
pan Panama 15
per Peru 13
pri Puerto Rico 22
pry Paraguay 11
slv El Salvador 33
sur Surinam 0
tca Turks and Caicos Islands 0
tto Trinidad and Tobago 33
ury Uruguay 31
vct St. Vincent 0
ven Venezuela 42
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